PUTIN'S DILLEMA
Like Trump, Vladimir Putin is a master at bully and bluff.
He knows how to play a weak hand well and is acutely aware of the weaknesses of liberal democracy and the constraints imposed upon his enemies by fidelity to the
rule of law and accepted norms of behaviour. Thus far, from Georgia to Crimea,
he has got away with levels of criminal recklessness virtually scot free. But ‘success’
like this can be heady, and even the most composed of poker players can overplay
their hand.
Public opinion in autocratic
and semi-autocratic states is a complex
affair, measuring it is difficult, but it does exist, as the rulers of Kazakhstan are just finding out. For Putin’s Russia, which belongs in the second category, the
pressures are similar but more complex than many similar autocratic states. The
pressure of public expectations of reasonable incomes that keep pace with
prices, matched by the competing pressure to meet the demands of greedy elite
supporters and those commanding the army and security services. Moreover the Russian
population generally and the middle class in particular are well educated, patriotic and nationalist mantras can only take Putin so far if the state becomes
cash strapped, - and keeping massed divisions on the border with Ukraine is very
costly. Whilst any prolonged struggle in Ukraine is bound to have an impact in Russia, - causalities can be difficult to hide, -with the added possibility of unrest spilling over a long and porous border.
Perhaps the greatest danger
in the current situation lies in Putin’s psychological mindset. He is, as a
recent essay he penned illustrates, obsessed by Ukraine, and given Russian
history it is not hard to understand why a nationalist would be so obsessed. Putin's image
of the Ukraine however is a fairy tale that bears no resemblance to current realities,
realities incidentally he helped create. He sees most Ukrainians as yearning
for reunion with their Russian brothers and sisters, trapped by the machinations of a West which is seeking to detach Ukraine from its historical roots.
He thinks that Russian troops will mostly met with bread salt and flowers.[1]
In reality Ukraine is a very
different place from the Ukraine that formed a component part of the Soviet
Union. Ukrainians have grown accustomed to their independence, and they rather
like it. Self identity has grown as has an appetite for free elections and free
institutions, in short all the accoutrements of democracy. Even those more
inclined to look east rather than west, identifying with their Russian cousins, tend to nurse a fondness for Russia rather than Putin. Indeed Russian interference
and pressure,- the seizure of the Crimea, and the sponsoring of separatist groups in the border region, - have done more to alienate Ukrainians than any of the
attractions of a western realignment.
To finish where I started
Putin is a gambler, though he may not be willing to sit on what he thinks is a good hand for very long, nor can he afford to do so. Everything depends on how
he calculates the Americans and Europeans will react. If he understands that
the cost of invading Ukraine could lead to the destabilisation of Russian society
he will back down. He must be so convinced.
[1]
Though given the size of the force he is assembling on the border he seems at
least open to the idea that it might not be a complete cakewalk.
